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Dissecting Hobby Lobby’s Corporate
Person
A PROCEDURAL PROPOSAL FOR ALIGNING
CORPORATE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary gap between corporate rights and
responsibilities is attributable in part to the ad hoc way in which
the American corporate-person doctrine has evolved since the late
nineteenth century.1 The absence of a standard for determining
corporate personhood and the arbitrary nature in which these
rights were allocated have clouded the Supreme Court’s vision of
just what a corporation “is” in other areas of the Court’s
jurisprudence.2 Instead, both the Supreme Court and lower courts
have done backflips to arrive at results that they deem satisfactory
without enunciating a standard or test to be applied in future
cases. Furthermore, because courts and legislatures work
independently, Congress historically has not passed reactionary
statutes to map corporate responsibilities onto their everexpanding, judicially created rights. The result is a gulf between
the true nature of a corporation, its rights, and its corresponding
responsibilities. Nowhere is this gulf more evident than in the
Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The resulting void
between corporate personhood rights and contemporary corporate
personal jurisdiction doctrine is primarily due to the fact that the
Supreme Court’s jurisdictional jurisprudence has conceptualized
the corporation as a static, theoretical being, as if plucked straight
from a business organizations law school textbook. In reality, the
Court itself, over the course of the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, created a much different “thing” than what it
envisioned in its seminal corporate personal jurisdiction cases.
After the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, a series of cases spawned by the burgeoning
1 Malcom J. Harkins III, The Uneasy Relationship of Hobby Lobby, Conestoga
Wood, the Affordable Care Act, and the Corporate Person: How a Historical Myth Continues
to Bedevil the Legal System, 7 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 205 (2014).
2 See Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities: Personal
Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 126-27 (2013).
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railroad industry forced the Supreme Court to decide whether
corporations were persons for equal protection purposes.3 A
headnote erroneously inserted4 by a court reporter in the 1886
case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad
breathed life into the corporate personhood doctrine:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of
opinion that it does.5

While that position was not official precedent because it appeared
only in a headnote, it was soon adopted in Pembina Consolidated
Silver Mining & Milling Company v. Pennsylvania in 1888.6 Since
then, though, the Supreme Court has utterly failed to set forth a
consistent standard for when a corporation may or may not claim
personhood status.7 Rather, the major cases shaping the corporate
personhood doctrine have largely been results oriented.8 For
example, in 2010, the Supreme Court rendered its seminal
decision in Citizens United v. FEC.9 There, the Court held that
the First Amendment barred the government from “suppress[ing]
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”10
This expansion of First Amendment political speech rights to
corporations gave nonprofit corporations, for-profit corporations,
and labor unions the largely unfettered right to contribute to
“electioneering communications” from their general treasuries.11
This ruling took an unprecedented step toward putting the
corporate person on even ground with natural persons.
Nonsentient, for-profit corporations can now express political
beliefs and can take concerted actions in furtherance of them.12
Four years later, the Supreme Court decided Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,13 where the Court held that for-profit
corporations are “persons” under the Religious Freedom
Harkins III, supra note 1, at 214-15.
Id. at 247-48.
5 Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
6 Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181, 189 (1888) (“Under the designation of person there is no doubt that a private
corporation is included.”).
7 Harkins III, supra note 1, at 211.
8 Id. at 305.
9 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
10 Id. at 365.
11 Id. at 319-21 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441b). “[E]lectioneering communications”
consist of all communications that “expressly advocate the election or defeat of a [political]
candidate, through any form of media.” Id. at 319-20.
12 See id. at 365.
13 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
3

4
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Restoration Act (RFRA). There, the Court bifurcated the
corporate person into the “classic” corporation and the closely
held corporation and allowed only closely held corporations to
claim religious exemption from the birth control mandate in the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Affordable
Care Act).14 While Hobby Lobby did not deal with personal
jurisdiction, the Court’s creation of a new, more “free” corporate
person now presents the Court with the opportunity to forge a
doctrine that would align corporate rights and responsibilities
for closely held corporations much more narrowly than it has
done for “classic” corporations.
This note argues that the personal jurisdiction doctrine
has progressed with a constant view of corporations in the
abstract without taking into account the ever-evolving nature of
corporations as persons. The failure of courts to recognize the
evolution of corporations when shaping personal jurisdiction
doctrine was most recently exemplified in the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Martinez v. Aero Caribbean.15 There, the court held
that tag jurisdiction (also known as “transitory” and “transient”
jurisdiction) does not apply to corporations.16 Tag jurisdiction is
the method of establishing general personal jurisdiction over a
defendant by serving them personally while he or she is physically
present in a given forum, even if only “transitor[ily]” present.17 The
court’s ruling rested on the traditional theory that the corporation
is a legal fiction—a personality separate and apart from its
officers.18 But cases like Citizens United and Hobby Lobby cannot
be justified without acknowledging a contradictory theory.19
Corporations, and closely held corporations in particular,
now possess the potential to have political and religious beliefs.20
Corporations, however, are not sentient beings.21 They cannot
decide for themselves which religion or political ideology to
14 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. The
Affordable Care Act requires most employer-supported health plans to cover preventive care
products and procedures without copayments, deductibles, or cost sharing. This includes all
FDA-approved contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures prescribed for women,
but not products or procedures that induce an abortion.
15 Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2014).
16 Id. at 1064. The Ninth Circuit concluded that corporations cannot be
subject to tag jurisdiction without specifically delineating whether certain types of
corporations could be. Id. at 1071.
17 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990).
18 Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d at 1069.
19 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
20 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751; Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
21 Michael Nagler & Stephanie Van Hook, Corporations Are Not People:
We Hold These Truths to Be Self-Evident. . ., COMMON DREAMS (Oct. 12, 2011),
http://www.commondreams.org/views/2011/10/12/corporations-are-not-people-we-holdthese-truths-be-self-evident [http://perma.cc/775V-AN5N].
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possess.22 If a corporation is to have a religious or political
affiliation, it is because the owners and officers (often the same
people in the closely held context) superimpose their own religious
and political beliefs onto the corporate personality. This renders
the notion of the corporation as a separate personality from its
owners a fiction of the past with regards to closely held
corporations; when a corporate officer’s religious or political views
are attributed to the corporation, their respective personalities
merge. In this respect, the new closely held corporate person
resembles a partnership much more than it resembles a
corporation. In light of Hobby Lobby (and Citizens United, to a
lesser degree), tag jurisdiction—which is valid over partnerships—
should be conferred on closely held corporations when a corporate
officer is “tagged,” regardless of the nature of his or her contacts in
that forum. Conferring tag jurisdiction over closely held
corporations would be an important first step towards matching
corporate rights with corporate responsibilities.
Corporations are among the most powerful entities on the
planet. They generate immense wealth, provide jobs to billions of
people worldwide, catalyze innovation, and possess the potential
to effect profound social change.23 When operated ethically,
corporations serve an invaluable function in society. Despite this
immense amount of power, though, corporations are seemingly
uncomfortable in their “corporate skin.” They want to be people,
just like you and me, and for the last 150 years, American courts
have been happy to let corporations be persons—creating
personhood rights on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore,
whenever the judiciary has conferred a corporate personhood
right, it has not ventured to delineate all of the legal
consequences that correspond with that new right. This has
created a vast gulf between corporate rights and corresponding
legal responsibilities.24 And that gulf is widening.25
Part I of this note analyzes the pivotal cases on corporate
personhood and draws particular attention to the lack of a clear
legal standard for determining when a corporation is a person.
See id.
See J.D. Harrison, Who Actually Creates Jobs: Start-Ups, Small Businesses
or Big Corporations?, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/on-small-business/who-actually-creates-jobs-start-ups-small-businesses-or-big
-corporations/2013/04/24/d373ef08-ac2b-11e2-a8b9-2a63d75b5459_story.html [http://
perma.cc/HT6R-UM3Y].
24 See Michalski, supra note 2, at 126-27 (“As ‘artificial’ persons, corporations
can claim the constitutional rights of natural persons. But then they can turn around and
evade the obligations that come with personhood. . . . Rights must track obligations.”
(footnotes omitted)).
25 See id.
22
23
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Part II provides a cursory examination of the pivotal personal
jurisdiction cases and highlights the way in which the Supreme
Court’s conceptualization of the corporation has grown out of
touch with the corporate person it has created. Part III analyzes
and compares Aero Caribbean and Hobby Lobby from a
jurisdictional standpoint, illustrating that cases like Aero
Caribbean deserve a fresh jurisdictional analysis in light of Hobby
Lobby. Finally, Part IV argues that closely held corporations
should be subject to tag jurisdiction when one of their directors or
owners is personally served in a given forum.
I.

THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE

Corporations in America span as far back as the
Founding, albeit serving a much different role in society than they
do today.26 Prior to the nineteenth century, corporations were
created via special state charters and were charged with strict
public-serving purposes.27 While not an official prerequisite for
incorporation, the notion of the corporation as a vehicle for public
service appears to have been the prevailing view at the time.28 For
example, “colleges, guilds, and municipalities were often organized
as corporations, as were such public-serving transportation
ventures as canals or turnpikes.”29
For-profit “business” corporations, conversely, were few and
far between. By 1780, colonial legislatures had chartered a mere
seven business corporations.30 That number had only grown to 335
business corporations by 1800, with most of the incorporations
taking place within the last few years of the century.31
The general incorporation statutes of modern times were
nonexistent in the eighteenth century.32 Several scholars and
jurists, including Justice Stevens in his Citizens United partial
concurrence, argue that the state charter model reflected a belief
that corporations needed strict oversight precisely because they

26 Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1144 (2012).
27 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960,
at 112 (1992); Johnson, supra note 26, at 1145.
28 Johnson, supra note 26, at 1145.
29 Id.; Ian Speir, Corporations, the Original Understanding, and the Problem
of Power, 10 GEO. J.L. & POL’Y 115, 126 & nn.47-48 (2012).
30 Johnson, supra note 26, at 1145.
31 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 189 (2d ed. 1985).
32 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440 (2001).
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were supposed to act for the public welfare.33 The special
legislative charter, therefore, fostered a more rigid regulatory
paradigm than the statutes that governed noncorporate,
predominantly family-run businesses at that time.34
Despite the public-serving purpose of most corporations in
the late eighteenth century, special legislative charters became
synonymous with “perceptions of political cronyism.”35 This public
perception ultimately led to the demise of special legislative
charters altogether.36 With the procedural hurdle of obtaining
corporate status out of the way, corporate status for businesses
became prevalent.37 Following the death of special legislative
charters for incorporation, the strict public-serving vision of the
corporation also faded.38 Corporations became much more profit
driven.39 This led to serious questions regarding the nature of
corporations, their purpose, and the parameters of state control.
These questions were soon addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.40 The Court’s
ruling altered 400 years of prior corporate conceptualization and
laid the groundwork for the birth of the modern doctrine of
corporate personhood.
King George III of England granted Dartmouth College a
charter in 1769.41 The charter defined the purpose of the school,
established its structure and terms of governance, and provided
land for the campus.42 In 1815, the New Hampshire state
legislature attempted to alter Dartmouth College’s charter in order
to reinstate its deposed president. It sought to do so by placing the
power to appoint trustees in the hands of the state’s governor,
altering the composition of the board of trustees, and creating a
state board of visitors with veto power over trustee decisions.43
This effectively converted the school, a private corporation, into a
public corporation. The Board of Trustees brought an action of
trover against William H. Woodward, secretary and treasurer of
the Board of Trustees, to turn over the books, records, corporate
property, and corporate seal of the school.44
33

concurring).
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 427 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
Johnson, supra note 26, at 1145.
Id. at 1146.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
Id. at 518.
Id.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 625.
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Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, ruled that
the actions of the New Hampshire legislature unconstitutionally
interfered with Dartmouth’s rights under the Contract Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.45 The majority opinion famously defined
the nature of corporations:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence . . . .
Among the most important are immortality . . . . It is chiefly for the
purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and
capacities, that corporations were invented, and are in use. By these
means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of acting for
the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal being.46

The notion of an “immortal” corporation was groundbreaking.
Corporations under the public-service doctrine existed to serve a
specific purpose, and when that purpose ceased to exist, so too did
the corporation. Under that view, corporations were inherently
soulless.47 The English jurist Sir Edward Coke most famously
espoused this view, maintaining that corporations “cannot
commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they
have no souls.”48
This new understanding of American corporations had
other profound effects. States now had to either reserve the right
to alter corporate charters in the initial corporate charter itself or
forfeit the ability to do so after the initial grant.49 This made
corporate regulation more difficult for state governments and
granted private corporations, now free from the strictures of the
sharply defined corporate charters of the eighteenth century, a
great degree of fluidity in their operations. And, perhaps even
more importantly, Dartmouth College “heralded a recognition of
the force of the moral personality of the corporate entity, as a
consequence of which the corporation went from being the humble
servant of the state to being its virtual master.”50 While the case
was not one involving corporate personhood, the recognition of the
corporate “moral personality” established the key framework from
which the corporate-person doctrine would eventually grow.51
Dartmouth College was groundbreaking because corporations, in
Id. at 588-91 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10).
Id. at 636.
47 Michalski, supra note 2, at 126.
48 Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (K.B.).
49 Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract Nor Concession: The Public
Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 216 (2006).
50 Id. at 205.
51 Id. at 216.
45

46
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pursuit of private gain, thereafter possessed the ability to break
free from the confines of special legislative charters to establish
and maintain a revolutionary level of autonomy.52
From the time of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Dartmouth College to the end of the Civil War, corporate litigation
did little to aggrandize or restrict previously recognized personhood
rights.53 The passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, namely
the Fourteenth Amendment, provided the catalytic spark to ignite
the “corporate person” debate.54 That debate culminated in the
infamous case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad.55 The case arose from a challenge by the Southern
Pacific Railroad Company to taxes it allegedly owed Santa Clara
County and the State of California under provisions of the
California constitution.56 Those provisions prohibited railroads
from deducting the amount of their debts from the taxable value
of their property.57 The county claimed that it had the ability to
tax a fence owned by the railroad, while Southern Pacific
countered that the state constitution only granted California the
power to tax “the franchise, roadway, road-bed, rails, and rollingstock.”58 Southern Pacific refused to pay the taxes, and Santa
Clara County sued in state court to recoup the taxes owed.59
Southern Pacific removed the action to federal district court,
which ruled that the county lacked the authority to levy the
taxes.60 Santa Clara County appealed the decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court.61
The case is immortalized for statements that Chief Justice
Waite made to the litigants prior to commencement of oral
arguments. He stated that the Court did not wish to hear
arguments on whether corporations were persons under the
Fourteenth Amendment.62 While his exact words remain
unknown,63 the eventual characterization of the statement in the
U.S. Reports by court reporter Bancroft Davis would have a
Id.
JAN EDWARDS, TIMELINE OF PERSONHOOD RIGHTS AND POWERS (2002),
http://www.californiademocracy.org/corporations/resource/timeline.pdf [http://perma.cc/
G9L8-YSGQ].
54 Id.
55 Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
56 Id. at 397.
57 Id. at 404.
58 Id. at 405.
59 Id. at 397.
60 Id. at 398.
61 Id. at 394.
62 Harkins III, supra note 1, at 248 (“‘In opening the Court stated that it did not
wish to hear argument on the question whether the Fourteenth Amendment applie[d] to
such corporations as [were] parties in these suits.”).
63 Id. at 248 n.149.
52
53
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profound impact on American corporate law.64 Weeks after the
oral argument, Davis summarized the Chief Justice’s preargument statements in a headnote:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of
opinion that it does.65

Because the statement only appeared in a headnote, and not in
the opinion itself, it was not officially controlling law with the
issuance of the decision.66 But in 1888, the Court went on to
officially adopt this stance in Pembina Consolidated Silver
Mining & Milling Company v. Pennsylvania, albeit in dicta.67
In Pembina, a Colorado corporation argued that certain
licensing fees levied against it by the State of Pennsylvania
denied it equal protection of the laws because Pennsylvania did
not impose the same fees against Pennsylvania corporations.68
While the Court found that the fee did not amount to a violation of
equal protection, Justice Field, a known proponent of expansive
corporate personhood at the time,69 wrote that private corporations
were “no doubt”70 included in the designation of “person.” Justice
Field quoted Justice Marshall and stated that “[t]he great object of
a corporation is to bestow the character and properties of
individuality on a collective and changing body of men.”71 And in
the same Supreme Court term, Justice Field further espoused that
position in Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Beckwith.72
In Beckwith, the plaintiff raised Fourteenth Amendment
due process and equal protection challenges to an Iowa law that
allowed plaintiffs to recover double damages for injuries resulting
from railroads.73 Justice Field again declared that corporations
were persons under the Fourteenth Amendment and stated that
“corporations can invoke the benefits of provisions of the

See id. at 248.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
66 Harkins III, supra note 1, at 248.
67 Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181, 188-89 (1888) (“Under the designation of ‘person’ there is no doubt that a private
corporation is included.”).
68 See id. at 181-83.
69 Dr. Paul Kens, Nothing to Do with Personhood: Corporate Constitutional
Rights and the Principle of Confiscation, SELECTED WORKS OF PAUL KENS DR. (Feb. 9,
2015), works.bepress.com/paul_kens/4/download/ [http://perma.cc/V4MV-H936].
70 Pembina, 125 U.S. at 189.
71 Id. (quoting Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 562 (1830)).
72 Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
73 Id. at 28.
64

65
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Constitution and laws which guarantee to persons the enjoyment
of property . . . or prohibit legislation injuriously affecting it.”74
These decisions set off a firestorm of litigation. While an
immense degree of debate at the time questioned whether the
Reconstruction Amendments applied only to African-Americans
or to all persons, one thing was clear: corporations were eager to
utilize the Fourteenth Amendment to enhance their rights.75
According to research conducted by Jan Edwards, Board Member
for the California Center for Democracy, a staggering 288 of the
Fourteenth Amendment cases brought before the Supreme Court
from 1890 to 1910 dealt with corporations, whereas only “19 dealt
with African Americans.”76 Moreover, courts over the course of the
next century were largely willing to accommodate corporate
requests for expansions of their rights.77

Id.
Harkins III, supra note 1, at 235.
76 EDWARDS, supra note 53.
77 For example, the Supreme Court granted corporations Fourth Amendment
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures in Hale v. Henkel in 1906. Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1906) (“Although . . . we are of the opinion that an officer of a
corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute of the State of its creation, or of an
act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce
the books and papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a
corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of
individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a
collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property
cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of
law, and is protected, under the Fourteenth Amendment, against unlawful discrimination.
Corporations are a necessary feature of modern business activity, and their aggregated
capital has become the source of nearly all great enterprises.” (citation omitted)). In 1967,
the Supreme Court granted corporations Fourth Amendment protection from random
inspection by fire departments, holding that an administrative warrant is necessary to
conduct an inspection of “commercial premises.” See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46
(1967) (“We therefore conclude that administrative entry, without consent, upon the
portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled
through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure. . . . We
hold only that the basic component of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment—
that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure—is applicable in this context,
as in others, to business as well as to residential premises.”). In 1922, corporations were
granted Fifth Amendment “takings” protection in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon when the
Pennsylvania Coal Company was allowed to bring a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute on
regulatory takings grounds. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In 1977,
corporations received the right to invoke Fifth Amendment protection from double jeopardy
in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., a criminal antitrust case in which the
government attempted to retry the defendant after the first trial ended in acquittal due to a
hung jury. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 565-67 (1977) (“A
‘hopelessly deadlocked’ jury was discharged when unable to agree upon a verdict at the
criminal contempt trial of respondent corporations . . . . The Court of Appeals reasoned that,
since reversal of the acquittals would enable the United States to try respondents a second
time, the bar of the Double Jeopardy Clause ‘leads inescapably to the conclusion that no
appeal lies from the directed verdict ordered by the court below.’ . . . We affirm.” (quoting
Providence Bank v. Bookings, 534 F.2d 585, 589 (1976))).
74
75
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In 1978, a landmark case, First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, struck down a Massachusetts statute prohibiting banks
and other business corporations from making contributions or
expenditures to ballot initiative campaigns that did not directly
“affect[ ] . . . the property, business or assets of the corporation.”78
Invoking the First Amendment, Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, stated,
We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the
decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise
would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that
protection simply because its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to
the satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its business or property.79

This case was a major victory for corporate personhood and would
be relied on heavily by the majority in Citizens United over three
decades later.
These are just a handful of the well-known cases in which
corporations were placed on an even plane with individuals in
terms of constitutional rights. While they all dealt with vastly
different constitutional provisions, facts, and parties, one thing
unites them: not one of these cases attempts to enunciate any
standard, test, or rule for when corporations are appropriately
deemed to be “persons” and when they are not; instead, the Court
in each of these cases was results oriented and sought to further
whatever its notion of “justice” was in the case before it—rather
than enunciating objective criteria as a basis for future decisions.
Before arriving at the modern dilemma, a cursory
examination of the evolution of corporate personal jurisdiction in
the United States is necessary. This will highlight the
differences between the theoretical corporation envisioned by
the Court in its major decisions and the true nature of
corporations as persons.
II.

SETTING THE STAGE: THE EVOLUTION OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN AMERICA

The doctrine of personal jurisdiction in American
jurisprudence has endured a protean history since its inception in
Pennoyer v. Neff in 1877.80 Pennoyer was firmly grounded in the
principle that the power of any court was strictly limited to the
geographical boundaries of the forum in which it sat.81 In time,
78
79
80
81

First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1978).
Id. at 784.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto.) 714 (1877).
Id. at 720.
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however, “that strict territorial approach yielded to a less rigid
understanding.”82 Spurred by “changes in the technology of
transportation and communication, and the tremendous growth
of interstate business activity,”83 courts were forced to grapple
with the notion of answering complex, novel questions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction within the requirements of
constitutional due process. Crucially, though, throughout the
doctrine’s evolution, the Court has always viewed the corporation
as an invisible, intangible entity separate from its directors,
officers, and shareholders84—that is, only “present” in its state of
incorporation, principal place of business, and wherever its
contacts are so “systematic and continuous” that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction satisfies “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”85 Yet the doctrine has wholly failed to account
for the advances the Court itself has granted to corporations in
expanding their rights as persons.
The extraterritorial evolution of the doctrine culminated
in the Supreme Court’s canonical decision in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington.86 There, the International Shoe Company, a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St.
Louis, Missouri, was engaged in the business of manufacturing
and selling shoes.87 The State of Washington required all
employers that conducted business within the state to pay a tax
that would contribute to the state unemployment fund.88
International Shoe had no office in Washington and conducted
very little business there.89 International Shoe did not pay the
unemployment fund tax, and Washington brought suit for the
moneys owed90 and then personally served one of International
Shoe Company’s in-state salesmen with a notice of assessment, a
copy of which was also sent by registered mail to the company’s
office in St. Louis.91

82 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990)
(opinion of Scalia, J.).
83 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014) (quoting Burnham, 495
U.S. at 617).
84 See generally Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (“A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”).
85 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
86 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
87 Id. at 313.
88 Id. at 315.
89 Id. at 313.
90 Id. at 312.
91 Id.
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International Shoe made a special appearance in
Washington before the office of employment92 to challenge the
alleged tax deficiency “on the ground that the service upon
appellant’s salesman was not proper service upon appellant; that
appellant was not a corporation of the State of Washington and
was not doing business within the state; that it had no agent
within the state upon whom service could be made.”93 The
unemployment tribunal ruled that the State of Washington was
entitled to the tax payments, and the decision was subsequently
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Washington.94 The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide, inter alia, whether
the company’s activities within the State of Washington were
sufficient for the state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
it.95 The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Stone, held that a
state may authorize its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant has “certain
minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” 96 In deciding whether a plaintiff has
successfully obtained personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant, courts must consider both the nature of the
defendant’s contacts, as well as those contacts’ relation to the
cause of action in the case before the court.97 Applying this
standard, the Court held that International Shoe’s contacts with
the state, including the constant flow of orders that brought
International Shoe’s products into the state and the permanent
display of shoe samples in shoe stores in Washington over a span
of several years, rendered it amenable to suit there.98 Accordingly,
the State of Washington was entitled to the tax payments.99
With International Shoe’s historic reformation of
Pennoyer’s principle of strict territorial limitation, litigation
surrounding general and specific jurisdiction100 has most
Id.
Id.
94 Int’l Shoe Co. v. State, 154 P.2d 801 (Wash. 1945).
95 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 310.
96 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
97 See id. at 317.
98 Id. at 314-15.
99 Id. at 321.
100 Specific jurisdiction is a contacts-based exercise of personal jurisdiction. See
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) (“It has
been said that when a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit
arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State is exercising
‘specific jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”). On the other hand, “[a] court may assert
general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any
and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v.
92
93
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frequently confronted the question of when it is appropriate for a
court to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.101
Courts have grappled with these cases, wary of offending
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”102 Courts
have set forth a range of analyses for cases involving goods in the
“stream of commerce,”103 including whether individuals or
corporations have “purposefully availed” themselves of the forum104
and whether a corporation is “at home”105 in a given forum.
Despite its pedigree as the consummate case in twentiethcentury personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, International Shoe
left many questions unanswered. One such question was whether
International Shoe established the proper inquiry for every
evaluation of personal jurisdiction, or whether Pennoyer’s
principle of personal service of process on a defendant in the
forum state was still a valid means of obtaining personal
jurisdiction over an otherwise out-of-state defendant.
In 1990, the Court tackled the question of whether in-state
service upon an individual was sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction in Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of
Marin.106 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a plurality, stated,
“The question we must decide today is whether due process
requires a similar connection between the litigation and the
defendant’s contacts with the State in cases where the defendant
is physically present in the State at the time process is served
upon him.”107 In Burnham, a husband and wife, residents of New
Jersey, separated.108 The couple agreed that Mrs. Burnham would
take custody of the children and move to California, with Mr.
Burnham remaining in New Jersey.109 When Mr. Burnham
visited California on business, Mrs. Burnham served him with a
summons and complaint for divorce proceedings in California.110
Mr. Burnham returned to New Jersey but eventually went back
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011)). Corporations are at home in their state(s) of
incorporation and the state of their principal place of business. Individuals are at home in
their state of domicile.
101 See, e.g., Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 310);
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
102 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
103 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd., 480 U.S. at 103-04.
104 Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 482 (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Maschara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 (11th Cir. 1984)).
105 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
106 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990).
107 Id. at 610.
108 Id. at 607.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 608.
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to California to make a “special appearance” in order to quash
service of process on the ground that the Superior Court lacked
personal jurisdiction.111 Mr. Burnham argued that he lacked the
requisite minimum contacts with California to establish personal
jurisdiction because he had only visited California a few times for
business and to visit his children.112 The Superior Court denied
his motion, and the California Court of Appeals subsequently
denied his request for mandamus relief.113 The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the state high court.114 In so doing,
Justice Scalia wrote that a state’s ability to exercise power over
defendants found within its borders, regardless of how long that
person is in the state, was one of the most “firmly established
principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition.”115
Burnham was a divorce case, and so the question of
whether the Court’s holding applied to corporations was not
implicated. With Hobby Lobby’s creation of a “new” closely held
corporate person, whose full list of rights is untold and potentially
expansive, the Court should confer tag jurisdiction over closely
held corporations when an owner or officer is tagged in a given
forum. This would better align the rights and responsibilities of
the closely held corporate person than the court ever has through
its conceptualization of the classic corporation.
III.

A WINDOW FOR TAG JURISDICTION OVER CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS

A.

Hobby Lobby: The Illegitimate Birth of the Religious,
Closely Held Corporate Person

In June 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.116 Although the
case did not deal with personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court’s
holding arbitrarily117 bifurcated the corporate person into the
“classic” corporation and the closely held corporation, affording
the right to opt out of federal legislation on religious grounds to
the latter. The decision opens the door for a new era of corporate
Id.
Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 628.
115 Id. at 610.
116 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
117 The selection of the undefined closely held corporation truly was arbitrary.
While the majority explained why it did not extend the exemption to all corporations, it did
not explain why the undefined closely held corporation was the proper outer bound for
eligibility for the exemption.
111
112
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personhood if the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, decides
to deal with the two corporate persons separately going forward.
Hobby Lobby dealt with the consolidated challenges of three
private corporations to the contraceptive mandate promulgated
by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)118 in the
Affordable Care Act.119 Under the Affordable Care Act, employers
who provide health insurance coverage to their employees were
required to provide “preventive care and screenings” for women
without “any cost sharing requirements.”120 The “preventive care”
included 20 types of contraception, and “four of those
methods . . . may have the effect of preventing an already
fertilized egg from developing any further by inhibiting its
attachment to the uterus.”121 Employers could either comply with
the mandate or pay steep monetary penalties.122
All of the plaintiff corporations (Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., and Mardel Corp.) were
founded and operated pursuant to Christian ideals123 and are
family owned and controlled.124 Each family claimed that their
religion dictated that life begins at conception and that they were
all morally opposed to the use of contraception on the belief that
its use is an act of abortion.125 They argued that the penalties for
failure to comply with the mandate constituted a substantial
burden on the exercise of their religion.126 The Supreme Court, led
by Justice Samuel Alito, ruled that for-profit, closely held
corporations are “persons” within the meaning of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.127 Therefore, closely held corporations
with owners who object to the contraceptive mandate of the
Affordable Care Act may opt out of covering contraception in their
employee insurance packages.128
The decision to limit the exemption to closely held
corporations is important. First, Justice Alito, writing for the
majority, did not explain why the closely held corporation was the
118 HHS is the U.S. government’s principal agency for protecting the health of
all Americans and providing essential human services, especially for those who are
least able to help themselves. HHS Secretary Sylvia Mathews Burwell was the named
appellant in Hobby Lobby. About HHS, HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/about/index.html#
[http://perma.cc/KSV4-N6F5] (last visited May 5, 2016).
119 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
120 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).
121 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762-63.
122 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(a)-(b) (2012).
123 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764-65.
124 Id. at 2774.
125 Id. at 2759.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 2768.
128 Id. at 2783-85.
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appropriate entity at which to draw the line. Secondly, the
majority did not define “closely held,” which is problematic, as
several potential definitions exist. The lack of a clearly enunciated
definition of “closely held” forces entities seeking to take
advantage of the exemption to guess as to whether they will
qualify or not. Most notably, this decision simultaneously served
as a “first” in the progression of, and an unprecedented limit on,
corporate personhood rights. The decision is the first from the
Supreme Court to allow for-profit corporations to seek exemption
from a federal law of general applicability on religious grounds.
On the other hand, by arbitrarily limiting its applicability to only
closely held corporations, the Supreme Court bifurcated the
corporate person into two different types: the “classic,” allencompassing legal conceptualization of the corporation that had
dominated the Court’s jurisprudence since the railroad cases, and
the new, “religious” closely held corporate person. The creation of
two different corporate persons presents the Court with the
opportunity to align the rights and responsibilities of the new
closely held corporate person in future jurisprudence—if the court
treats the two persons as separate entities going forward. To
decline to do so would mar Hobby Lobby as a results-oriented
decision and would weaken its legitimacy.
In balking at the notion of granting the right to religious
exemption to all corporations, the Court, led by Justice Alito,
acknowledged something that it had never acknowledged
before: large, for-profit, publicly traded corporations cannot
realistically share a common religion among its owners (i.e., its
shareholders).129 Justice Alito reasoned:
These [consolidated] cases, however, do not involve publicly traded
corporations, and it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to
which HHS refers will often assert RFRA claims. HHS has not pointed
to any example of a publicly traded corporation asserting RFRA rights,
and numerous practical restraints would likely prevent that from
occurring. For example, the idea that unrelated shareholders—including
institutional investors with their own set of stakeholders—would agree to
run a corporation under the same religious beliefs seems improbable.130

The majority’s awareness of the improbability that numerous,
diffuse shareholders could agree to a unified religious core for
corporate governance is well placed, albeit unprecedented. It is
clear that shareholders agree on basic principles of corporate
governance, such as profit maximization. But getting those same

129
130

Id. at 2774.
Id.
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shareholders to agree on a single corporate religious belief system
would likely become an insurmountable task.
One glaring problem with the Hobby Lobby decision is
that the majority neglected to define what they meant by “closely
held corporations,” and there are several possible definitions
under current law. For example, the IRS defines a closely held
corporation as one with at least “50% of the value of its outstanding
stock” being held by five people or fewer at any time during the
previous tax year.131 Under the IRS definition, personal-service
corporations (e.g., law firms, medical offices, accounting firms)
cannot be closely held corporations.132 It is estimated that the IRS
definition encapsulates 90% of the companies in the United
States,133 including corporations like agricultural behemoth
Cargill, which “employs 140,000 people and had $136.7 billion in
revenue in fiscal 2013.”134 It can be inferred, though, that the
definition contemplated by the Hobby Lobby majority expands at
least as far as S corporations, since Hobby Lobby was incorporated
under that corporate form. S corporations are a distinct corporate
form that must have 100 or fewer shareholders.135 S corporations
do not pay traditional corporate taxes; rather, gains and losses flow
through to the shareholders, who report the gains and losses in
their individual tax returns and pay taxes at their personal tax
rates.136 Crucially, there is no requirement that an S corporation
have 50% or more of its stock held and controlled by five or fewer
shareholders, as is the case with closely held corporations as
defined by the IRS. This fact alone indicates that the Supreme
Court does not wish to confine its definition of closely held
corporations to the IRS definition, as it extended the opt-out from
the birth control mandate to S corporations, which do not have to
satisfy the IRS requirements for closely held corporations.
It is also noteworthy (and puzzling) that the Court was
willing to limit the types of corporations that can exercise
131 Entities,
IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Help-&-Resources/Tools-&-FAQs/FAQs-forIndividuals/Frequently-Asked-Tax-Questions-&-Answers/Small-Business,-Self-Employed,Other-Business/Entities/Entities-5 [http://perma.cc/5FPF-X5ML] (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
132 Id.
133 Stephanie Armour & Rachel Feintzeig, Hobby Lobby Ruling Raises
Question: What Does ‘Closely Held’ Mean?, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2014, 2:56 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/hobby-lobby-ruling-begs-question-what-does-closely-heldmean-1404154577 [http://perma.cc/8F6F-CK27].
134 Drew Desilver, What Is a ‘Closely Held Corporation,’ Anyway, and How
Many Are There?, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 7, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/07/07/what-is-a-closely-held-corporation-anyway-and-how-many-are-there/
[http://perma.cc/7UDU-TA52].
135 S Corporations, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-SelfEmployed/S-Corporations [http://perma.cc/M4YY-SY44] (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
136 Id.

2016]

DISSECTING HOBBY LOBBY’S CORPORATE PERSON

1767

religion in Hobby Lobby, but was unwilling to limit which
corporations could exercise political speech in Citizens United—
all without explaining why. Applying the Hobby Lobby
majority’s own reasoning, if finding unanimous agreement
between all shareholders regarding a public corporation’s
religion would be impossible,137 the same could easily be said for
political beliefs. Finally, the majority neglected to enunciate a
test or standard for when a corporation may be a person, keeping
with the Court’s motif of results-oriented decisionmaking in
corporate personhood cases.
B.

Disagreement Between Circuit Courts over Corporate
Tag Jurisdiction

Around the very same time that Hobby Lobby was being
decided, the Ninth Circuit heard a case with interesting
implications for corporate personal jurisdiction. In Martinez v.
Aero Caribbean, the Ninth Circuit held that there cannot be tag
jurisdiction over corporations.138 The case arose from a plane
crash off the coast of Cuba in 2010, where all 68 passengers on
board perished.139 The plane was designed by Avions de Transport
Regional (ATR),140 a company organized under French law with
its headquarters and principal place of business in France.141 The
Cervantes family, survivors of one of the deceased victims of the
crash, brought suit in the Northern District of California against
ATR for products liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and
wrongful death.142 The Cervantes family personally served ATR at
its headquarters in France.143 ATR immediately moved to dismiss
the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction in California.144 The
district court did not immediately grant its motion145 but instead
granted the Cervantes family a two-month window to conduct
limited jurisdictional discovery.146 During that two-month period,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014).
Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014) (“On the
assumption that tag jurisdiction exists only over natural persons who are physically present
in a forum state, International Shoe indicates that a corporation may be subject to personal
jurisdiction only when its contacts with the forum support either specific or general
jurisdiction. In the almost seventy years since International Shoe, the Supreme Court has
never suggested anything else.”).
139 Id. at 1064.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1065.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
137
138
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plaintiffs served “ATR’s vice president of marketing [personally]
while he was in California” for a conference.147
In a supplemental memorandum opposing the motion to
dismiss, plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that by serving ATR’s vicepresident of marketing personally in California, they had
acquired general personal jurisdiction over ATR in California
pursuant to Burnham.148 After the district court rejected the tag
jurisdiction argument and granted ATR’s motion to dismiss,149 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.150 The court
reasoned, “An officer of a corporation is not the corporation, even
when the officer acts on the corporation’s behalf. While a
corporation may in some abstract sense be ‘present’ wherever its
officers do business, such presence is not physical in the way
contemplated by Burnham.”151
The court’s distinction between the physical presence of
the officer and the physical presence of the corporation itself is
crucial because the notion is premised entirely on the American
jurisprudential conceptualization of corporations: that the
corporation is an invisible entity separate and apart from its
owners, present only in its state of incorporation and its principal
place of business.152 Under the early conception of corporations,
this view made sense. Concededly, even today it still makes sense
when applied to large, publicly traded corporations.153 In light of
Hobby Lobby, however, there is suddenly a soft spot in the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning. The one-size-fits-all approach for corporate
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence can hardly be called workable,
as the Supreme Court has departed from allocating blanket rights
to all corporations and has instead identified different types of
corporate persons capable of possessing different rights.154
Only one court in American history has come to a different
conclusion than the Ninth Circuit in Aero Caribbean. In 2001, the
First Circuit in Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern
Lights Club stated in a footnote, “We believe that the service of
process effected upon [defendant] also conferred personal
jurisdiction over the other [corporate] defendants.”155 The decision
has never been adhered to, especially because the case was
147
148

611 (1990)).
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Id.
Id. (citing Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604,
Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 2012 WL 1380247, at *4 (N.D. CA 2012).
Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d at 1065.
Id. at 1068 (citations omitted).
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014).
See supra Section III.A.
N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57, 63 n.10 (1st Cir. 2000).
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decided on other grounds.156 Nevertheless, this disagreement
between circuit courts may be ripe for exploitation in the wake of
Hobby Lobby and its creation of the “new” corporate person.
IV.

KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY: CONFERRING TAG
JURISDICTION OVER HOBBY LOBBY’S CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATION

The Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby effectively
created a new corporate entity, the likes of which the Court had
never before contemplated in its corporate personhood cases or its
personal jurisdiction cases—the religious closely held corporation.
This is certainly not to say that closely held corporations
themselves are new creations of the Court—they have essentially
existed since before the Founding. In terms of corporate
personhood jurisprudence, though, the Court had never before
discriminated between closely held corporations and all other
types of corporations when recognizing new corporate rights. To
better align the rights of such lifelike, closely held corporations
with the legal responsibilities of real persons, courts should confer
tag jurisdiction over closely held corporations.
In terms of personhood rights possessed by corporations,
closely held corporations are the closest to being natural persons
out of all types of corporations. In the wake of Hobby Lobby,
closely held corporations retain all rights previously granted to
the “classic” corporate person, as well as the right to seek
exemption from a federal law of general applicability on grounds
of religious objection under RFRA.157 Closely held corporations
can exercise religious beliefs, political beliefs, and due to the
Court’s failure to enunciate a standard for when, why, and how a
corporation may assume the rights of the individual, seemingly
countless other untold rights. The Court must enunciate how it
defines closely held corporations to provide clarity to corporate
entities and their directors, owners, and counsel.
A.

Closely Held Corporations Should Be Amenable to Tag
Jurisdiction

Closely held corporations may now exercise their owners’
religious beliefs. But the corporation itself is not a sentient being.
It cannot think for itself, it cannot choose which religion to adhere
to, it cannot actively practice its religion, and it cannot make
156
157

Id. at 63, 66.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768-69.
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religious decisions, or any decisions, on its own. The
corporation is only “religious” because its owners and
directors, acting as corporate agents, superimpose their own
religious beliefs onto the corporation. In essence, Hobby Lobby
has eviscerated the divide between closely held corporations
as intangible entities and their owners.
This new legal right for closely held corporations and their
owners tears down the legal wall that once separated the
personalities of corporations and corporate owners and directors.
Now, the closely held corporation walks with its directors. The
beliefs of corporate directors of closely held corporations can be so
intricately and intimately intertwined with the corporate
personality that the two entities—traditionally separate and
distinct in classic corporate theory—are now one. The fear of
numerous, diffuse shareholders vying for different religious and
political beliefs within the corporation’s governance is rendered
irrelevant. By being owned by such a small cluster of individuals,
typically family members, the closely held corporation suddenly
becomes eerily “natural” in terms of personhood.
In this respect, the post–Hobby Lobby closely held
corporation is more analogous to a partnership than a traditional
corporation. And, crucially, tag jurisdiction over a partner of a
partnership confers personal jurisdiction over the entire
partnership. For example, in First American Corp. v. Price
Waterhouse LLP,158 the Second Circuit allowed for personal
jurisdiction over an entire partnership after one of its partners was
personally served in the forum state.159 The court, led by Judge
Jacobs, reasoned that no analysis of the partnership’s business
contacts with New York was necessary. Because there is no
distinction between the partners and the partnership as an
entity, tagging one of the partners was sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction over the entire entity.160
The Second Circuit’s decision turned on the same
distinction that previous corporate personhood cases had turned
on: the separate existence of the corporation from its directors,
officers, and shareholders.161 In First American, though, because
partnership law does not create a separate existence between
partners and the partnership, the court was willing to confer
personal jurisdiction over the partnership after one of the
partners was tagged in New York.162 Now, there is no separate
158
159
160
161
162

First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18.
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existence between the closely held corporation and its small core
of owners and directors. The religious, closely held corporation is
not much more than a shell that exhibits the religious beliefs of its
owners while allowing them to enjoy the benefit of limited liability.
Moreover, S corporations, which are included in the Court’s
definition of closely held, are treated extremely similarly to
partnerships for tax purposes. They are considered “pass through”
entities that do not pay corporate taxes but instead all incomes,
losses, credits, and deductions pass through to the shareholders
and are then reflected in their individual tax returns. Also, as with
partnerships, the closely held corporation is comprised of a small
group of individuals, all heavily invested in the corporation in
terms of capital and property and who expect to share in the
corporation’s profits and losses. The only difference is that closely
held corporations, under the IRS definition, have a ceiling on how
many people can comprise the majority ownership, while
partnerships only have a floor (two or more people). Therefore,
because the separation between the closely held corporate entity
and its owners has dissolved, and because many of the corporations
included in the Court’s definition of closely held (including Hobby
Lobby) are treated almost identically as partnerships, courts
should treat religious, closely held corporations more like
partnerships for purposes of personal jurisdiction. Namely, the
owners and directors of a closely held corporation (as
contemplated in the proposed definition above163) should be “tag
targets,” and successful personal service on them should confer
general personal jurisdiction in the forum state where they are
served, just as it would for partnerships and natural persons.
This rule certainly has several pros and cons. One possible
drawback is that it presents closely held corporations with
difficult choices. For example, closely held corporations may have
to turn away interested investors, and therefore capital injections,
if such investments would dilute the single shareholder’s
ownership to less than 50%, all to meet the IRS definition’s
requirements. But an actual benefit may be lurking behind this
choice; that is, such a decision would serve as a sorting
mechanism. Those closely held corporations that are truly serious
about imposing a religious (or other) belief onto the corporation
will ensure that they meet the criteria for being considered closely
held. Those who would prefer to avoid tag jurisdiction will accept
investors even if their ownership share would drop below 50%.
This will have the effect of keeping closely held corporations truly
closely held.
163

Infra Section IV.B.

1772

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:4

Moreover, closely held corporate defendants would not be
entirely powerless once served personally in a given forum. If
litigating in a forum is truly burdensome, a defendant still has
the tools of transfer or forum non conveniens in their belt to move
the litigation to a more conducive forum.164 Under either doctrine,
convenience and justice are the guiding concerns.165 Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno sets forth factors for determining when a forum is
convenient, including ease of access to evidence, “availability of
compulsory process for . . . unwilling” witnesses, cost of
attendance to willing witnesses, viewing the premises, and “other
practical problems.”166 There are also public considerations in
forum non conveniens cases, including court congestion, the
chosen forum’s interest in overseeing the litigation, choice of law
issues, and the burden of jury duty in a given forum.167 If a closely
held corporation was brought before a tribunal by being tagged, it
could move for transfer or dismissal by presenting arguments
attesting to the factors laid out above. Also, the owners of a closely
held corporation still retain the hallmark benefit of the corporate
form—limited liability—meaning that even when jurisdiction is
established over a corporation via tagging, the individual
shareholders are not personally liable. Hobby Lobby did not make
any attempt to alter that aspect of corporate formation. By
arming the owners of these corporations with these procedural
safeguards, the conferral of tag jurisdiction over closely held
corporations is fair and acknowledges the realities of the
contemporary nature of the closely held corporation.
B.

Defining the Post–Hobby Lobby Closely Held Corporate
Person

One troubling aspect of the Court’s decision in Hobby
Lobby is that the majority failed to define what exactly qualifies
as a closely held corporation. It did describe, however, three
considerations in its decision to limit the availability of the
religious exemption. First, the Court acknowledged that large
corporations would likely not be entitled to the RFRA exemption,
as it would be virtually impossible for shareholders to arrive at an
agreed-upon religion.168 Secondly, the majority justified granting
164 Edward M. Mullins & Christopher Kokoruda, Forum Non Conveniens—The
Defendant’s Toolbox, AM. B. ASS’N, http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/fall09/materials/
Mullins_Ed_251_EM10301029251_CLEMaterials_sysID_1734_707_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/
N53P-EP9Y] (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).
165 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249, 254 (1981).
166 Id. at 241 n.6 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
167 See id.
168 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014).
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the exemption to the plaintiff corporations because all were
“owned and controlled by members of a single family.”169 Finally,
the Court seemingly wished to include S corporations in its
definition of closely held, as Hobby Lobby is an S corporation.170
Taking the Court’s reasoning into consideration, closely
held corporations entitled to the RFRA exemption should be
defined as corporations at least 50% owned by a single
shareholder, with no more than 100 total shareholders. This
definition serves all of the Court’s explicit and implicit
considerations and concerns and would not disturb Hobby Lobby’s
ultimate outcome. First, a strict adoption of the IRS definition
would potentially undercut the Court’s desire to extend the
exemption to corporations owned and controlled by single families.
The IRS definition merely requires that 50% of the corporation be
owned by five or fewer shareholders.171 (It is important to note
that members of the same family may elect to be counted
collectively as a single shareholder.172) By requiring that 50% of
the company be owned by one shareholder (i.e., one family), the
more believable and bona fide the corporation’s religion becomes.
Also, this would potentially limit the number of massive closely
held corporate giants that fit the definition, as several of those
companies are 50% owned by more than one shareholder. Finally,
S corporations would still be eligible for the exemption, as long as
50% of the company is owned by a single shareholder.
Proceeding under this definition, Courts should confer tag
jurisdiction over closely held corporations. American courts have
always operated under a conceptualization of the corporation
exactly as it exists in textbooks—an invisible, separate personality
from its directors and shareholders. This conceptualization of
corporations made sense for a long time.173 Even as corporations
were given several of the same rights enjoyed by natural persons
under the Bill of Rights over the course of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, none of those decisions mirrored the degree
to which the Hobby Lobby decision redefined the corporate
person. Hobby Lobby’s bifurcation of the corporate person leaves
open the question of what other rights closely held corporations
may claim in the future. Whether the decision was good or bad,
now that the Supreme Court has created a new corporate person
in the closely held corporation, the Court has the opportunity to
Id.
Desilver, supra note 134.
171 Entities, supra note 131.
172 NIXON PEABODY LLP, SUBCHAPTER S—MAJOR OBSTACLES REMOVED 1 (2004),
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/RFIA_10182004.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PF9-8SS7].
173 See supra Part I.
169
170
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craft legal doctrine that aligns closely held corporate rights and
responsibilities in a more sensible fashion than the Court ever
has with the “classic” corporate person.
CONCLUSION
In rendering its decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., deeming closely held corporations “persons” under RFRA,
the Supreme Court broke from its “one-size-fits-all” approach to
corporate personhood jurisprudence for the first time in the Court’s
history. The result is a doctrine steeped in uncertainty. The Court
should use this decision as a starting point to embark on a crusade
of aligning corporate rights and corporate responsibilities.
Courts should begin this new era of corporate
jurisprudence by conferring tag jurisdiction over closely held
corporations when an owner or director of the corporation is
personally served in a given forum. To do so would be sensible
from a practical standpoint, as the anatomical composition of the
closely held corporation is fundamentally different from the
“classic” corporation, as conceptualized by the Court in its over
150 years of corporate-person jurisprudence. Instead, the religious
closely held corporation, as contemplated by the Court in Hobby
Lobby, more closely resembles other business entities already
subject to tag jurisdiction, such as partnerships.
The “new” corporate person (i.e., the post–Hobby Lobby
closely held corporation) is as close to a natural person than any
corporation has ever been. It can exercise religious, political, and
seemingly several unrecognized rights. But since corporations are
not sentient beings, the closely held corporation would never be
able to choose a religious or political guiding principle on its own.
Indeed, it is the owners and directors of closely held corporations,
often the same people from one family, who impart their own
religious or political ideologies onto the corporation. This
commingling of traditional corporate functionality and personal
religious beliefs deconstructs the wall that previously existed
between the fictional corporate personality and the personality of
its directors and shareholders. The result is a merger between the
personalities of the owners of closely held corporations and the
corporations themselves. Now, wherever an owner or director of a
closely held corporation walks, so walks the corporation.
In this respect, courts should view closely held corporations
as being more anatomically analogous to partnerships than classic
corporations. The owners of closely held corporations, like
partnerships, are few in number and can custom tailor the
entity to their personal beliefs and goals. Also, many of the
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corporations included in the Supreme Court’s vague definition of
closely held (including Hobby Lobby) are treated almost
identically to partnerships, as opposed to classic corporations, for
tax purposes. One key distinction, though, is that partnerships,
but not corporations, can be subject to tag jurisdiction. This
distinction no longer makes sense, as the previous justification
for the rule—that corporations and their owners are separate
and distinct from one another—has been eroded as corporations
have been allowed to incrementally become more person-like
over time. As corporate personalities merge ever more
intimately with the personalities of their owners, the need to
align the legal responsibilities of corporations with those of their
owners becomes more urgent. To that end, courts should confer
tag jurisdiction over closely held corporations when one of their
owners or directors is personally served in a given forum. While
this would by no means serve as a cure-all for the gulf between
corporate rights and responsibilities, it would mark an
important first-step towards eliminating many of the inequitable
anomalies that plague American corporate personhood.
Andrew J. Fleming†

† J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2016; B.A., Siena College, 2013.
Thank you to Lillian Smith, Michael Piacentini, Nina Vershuta, and the entire staff of
the Brooklyn Law Review for their tireless work on this note. I would also like to thank
Professor Jayne Ressler and Professor Roger Michalski for their guidance as I
developed the topic of this note in the summer of 2014. Finally, I would like to thank
my friends and family for their constant support.

